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NINTH CIRCUIT V. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS: DEFINING “SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR”
AFTER ESTRADA-ESPINOZA V. MUKASEY
Enoka Herat
Abstract: Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), lawful permanent residents
are rendered removable if they commit an “aggravated felony” at any time after they are
admitted into the United States. Significant interpretive issues arise in determining whether a
non-citizen’s state-based criminal conviction meets the INA’s definition of an aggravated
felony. One aggravated felony enumerated in the INA is “sexual abuse of a minor.”1 The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has interpreted the phrase using a broad federal
definition as a guide. In Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,2 however, the Ninth Circuit declined
to defer to the BIA’s interpretation because the BIA’s decision was not a precedential
opinion warranting deference. In reviewing whether a California statutory rape conviction
constituted sexual abuse of a minor, the Estrada-Espinoza court applied a different federal
definition and concluded there was no violation, and thus, Mr. Estrada-Espinoza was not
deportable. The question of how to define “sexual abuse of a minor” will likely come before
the Ninth Circuit on substantive grounds once the BIA issues a deference-warranting
definition of the provision. This Comment argues that when the Ninth Circuit revisits the
issue, it should not defer to the BIA, regardless of the definition it promulgates. Rather, the
court should rule that the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” is unambiguous based on its plain
meaning, the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, holdings from sister circuits, and policy
considerations. This holding would be consistent with the best interpretation of the statute,
3
and Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council and its progeny.

INTRODUCTION
Juan Estrada-Espinoza had lived in the United States since he was
twelve years old.4 He was a lawful permanent resident—a greencard
holder.5 Juan first met Sonia Arredondo in 2001 when he was twenty
and she was sixteen.6 They soon developed a relationship, moved in
together and began raising their child together.7 Both of their parents
1. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)
(2006).
2. 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).
3. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
4. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1150.
5. Id.
6. Telephone Interview with Saad Ahmad, Attorney for Juan Estrada-Espinoza, Saad Ahmad &
Assocs., (May 8, 2009).
7. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1150.
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approved of and supported their relationship, as did their friends.8 The
District Attorney of their small town, however, felt otherwise.9 In 2004,
after Sonia had turned eighteen, Juan was charged with statutory rape,
convicted on four counts,10 and sentenced to 365 days in jail.11 Juan
faced the jarring prospect of deportation due to his conviction for sexual
abuse of a minor, an aggravated felony under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).12 In 2005, an immigration judge, relying on
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) precedent, ordered Juan deported
for having consensual sex with his underage girlfriend.13 The order was
affirmed by the BIA.14 Three years later, in Estrada-Espinoza v.
Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the BIA and held that
Juan was not deportable.15
Deportation16 due to an aggravated felony carries severe immigration
consequences, including a complete bar on returning to the United
States.17 In Juan’s case, this would have meant never again visiting the
country where he had spent nearly two decades of his life, the family he
had nurtured here, or the friends and connections he had made.
Since the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),18 the list of crimes constituting
aggravated felonies for which an alien can be deported has grown
considerably,19 and is no longer limited to the most severe crimes.20
8. Id.
9. Interview with Saad Ahmad, supra note 6.
10. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1150–51.
11. Id. at 1151.
12. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)
(2006).
13. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1151.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1160.
16. In 1996, the term “deportation” was changed to “removal” in the INA. However, the term
“deportation” is still used as a general term and has lost its term-of-art status. “Deportation” will
thus be used interchangeably with “removal” throughout this Comment. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A
Global Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights Law Can Reform our Immigration
System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 350 n.8 (2008).
17. See INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
18. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
19. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 384 (2006).
20. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
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Instead, misdemeanors, such as shoplifting, can now serve as the basis to
deport an immigrant as an aggravated felon, leading some scholars to
observe that “a crime need not be either aggravated or a felony.”21 In
1996, Congress added “sexual abuse of a minor” as an aggravated felony
to the INA.22
The BIA has the authority to interpret the INA, including the scope of
some of the deportability grounds such as aggravated felonies.23 While
some aggravated felony grounds are clearly defined by cross-reference
to federal criminal statutes, others are not.24 The deportation ground of
“sexual abuse of a minor” falls into the latter category, lacking crossreferencing. In Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez,25 the BIA used a federal
statute as a guide for interpreting the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor.”26
If a non-citizen is convicted of an eligible crime, he or she may be
charged with deportation by the Department of Homeland Security,
which has prosecutorial power in the immigration context.27 Then, if an
immigration judge determines that the crime constitutes sexual abuse of
a minor,28 the non-citizen will be ordered removed as an aggravated
1101(a)(43)(A) (1988) (including only murder, drug and weapons trafficking as aggravated
felonies) with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2006) (including over twenty categories of crimes).
21. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000). (“[A] conviction for simple
battery or for shoplifting with a one-year suspended sentence—either of which would be a
misdemeanor or a violation in most states—can be deemed an aggravated felony.”) (footnotes
omitted).
22. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627, § 321 (a)(1) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).
23. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron
deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms [in the INA] concrete meaning.”).
24. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006) (enumerating as an
aggravated felony “a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.”).
25. 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA 1999).
26. Id. at 995 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) (1994) (“the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation
of children, or incest with children”)).
27. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006)
(“[The] Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement
of this chapter[.]”).
28. See, e.g., Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 948 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming categorization of
sexual assault conviction involving a four-year-old victim as sexual abuse of a minor under the
INA); United States v. Mendoza-Iribe, 198 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming categorization
of conviction for penetration of the genital or anal opening of a minor under the age of fourteen by a
foreign object, section 289(j) of the California Penal Code, as sexual abuse of a minor).
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felon. However, the non-citizen can appeal the removal order to the
BIA.29 If a non-citizen’s crime fits within this definition, the BIA will
affirm the immigration judge’s order of removal.30 The non-citizen can
then appeal the decision to the circuit court of appeals in the jurisdiction
where the case originated.31
Circuit courts of appeals have limited jurisdiction to review BIA
orders of removal. IIRIRA stripped the judiciary of authority to review
final orders of removal relating to aggravated felonies.32 However,
circuit courts retain jurisdiction over questions of law,33 including the
question of what constitutes a crime of “sexual abuse of a minor.”34
Although circuit courts review questions of law de novo, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council35 instructed the judiciary to defer to agency interpretations of
statutes they administer.36 This authority has been limited somewhat by
Chevron’s progeny, particularly where the agency’s ruling does not
carry the force of law.37 Although the Court did not define “the force of
law,” it concluded that “interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force
of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”38
The Ninth Circuit in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey reviewed whether
statutory rape under section 261.5 of the California Penal Code is sexual
abuse of a minor for immigration purposes.39 The court did not apply the
Chevron doctrine to the BIA’s interpretation, because the BIA’s ruling

29. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(j) (2008).
30. E.g., Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008).
31. Id.
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2000).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) (“Nothing . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review,
shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a
petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”).
34. See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We review de novo
the legal question of whether a conviction under the relevant California statutes constitutes ‘sexual
abuse of a minor’ within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).”).
35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
36. Id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
37. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
38. Id.
39. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1150.
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did not carry the force of law.40 Instead, the court applied a definition
found in a federal criminal statute.41
Under the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence, the BIA need
only issue an opinion that does carry the force of law, thus making it
eligible for Chevron deference, in order to set aside the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation.42 This is the likely course that the BIA will take,
considering that it has issued precedential decisions defining other
challenged terms in the INA.43 If it does, the substantive issue of how to
interpret “sexual abuse of a minor” will likely come before the Ninth
Circuit.
Part I of this Comment analyzes judicial deference to interpretations
of law by administrative agencies including immigration agencies under
Chevron and its progeny. Part II addresses how the BIA has defined the
“sexual abuse of a minor” provision of the INA. Part III provides
background on the Ninth Circuit’s handling of the phrase “sexual abuse
of a minor,” and the legal context in which the case Estrada-Espinoza
arose. Part IV explores how other circuits have dealt with the issue.
Finally, Part V notes that the issue will likely be brought to the Ninth
Circuit on substantive grounds and argues that the Ninth Circuit should
rule that the provision is unambiguous based on a plain meaning
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit’s case law, the findings of sister circuits,
and policy considerations.

40. Id. at 1151.
41. Id. at 1152.
42. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005)
(“The better rule is to hold judicial interpretations contained in precedents to the same demanding
Chevron step one standard that applies if the court is reviewing the agency’s construction on a blank
slate: Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
construction.”).
43. See, e.g., Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008) (defining the INA
term “child abuse” issued after Ninth Circuit remand in the absence of a definition); Matter of
Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999) (defining the INA term “crime involving moral
turpitude”).
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CHEVRON COMPELS COURTS TO DEFER TO
REASONABLE AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF
AMBIGUOUS STATUTES EVEN WITH REGARDS TO
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Since Marbury v. Madison,44 interpreting laws has traditionally been
within the “province and duty” of the judicial branch.45 Reviewing
courts generally give deference to factual conclusions made by trial
courts and juries, but determine legal conclusions de novo. In the
modern administrative agency context, however, the Supreme Court has
developed a doctrine where courts defer to agency interpretations of law
in the face of ambiguity.46
In the landmark case, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Supreme Court explained how courts should determine
whether deference to an agency interpretation is appropriate.47 The
Supreme Court in Chevron created a rule where deference is sometimes
given to reasonable agency legal conclusions if the underlying statutory
provision is ambiguous.48 Aided by its progeny, Chevron has limited the
judicial scope of review relating to a wide range of agency action.49
However, some limits to the doctrine exist. For example, Chevron is not
applied when an agency interprets a statute that it does not administer.50
Additionally, under Christensen v. Harris County51 and United States v.
Mead Corp.,52 agency actions that lack the force of law are not given
44. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
45. Id.
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006).
47. 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
48. Id. at 844.
49. Id. Debate over Chevron’s impact continues. A recent empirical study of over 1000 Supreme
Court cases in which the Court reviewed agency interpretations of statutes led its authors to
conclude that “there has not been a Chevron ‘revolution’ at the Supreme Court level.” William N.
Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008). Although this
may be the overall trend, it may not be the case in the immigration context. A very recent Supreme
Court decision applying Chevron recognized that it is well settled that “[j]udicial deference in the
immigration context is of special importance.” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1159,
1163–64 (2009).
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (applying Chevron deference “[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers”).
51. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
52. 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001).

528

Enoka_Comment_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

9/2/2009 1:09 PM

Sexual Abuse of a Minor
deference. Where the Chevron doctrine does apply, appellate courts
reviewing an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that it
administers may defer rather than interpret the statute de novo.
More recently, the Supreme Court clarified the extent of agency
authority to interpret statutes. In National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,53 the Court gave agency legal
conclusions deference even when applicable circuit court precedent
conflicted.54 Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
this rule when it deferred to an agency interpretation of an ambiguous
immigration detention provision, rather than deferring to an existing
Supreme Court interpretation.55
A.

Chevron Established a Framework that Affords Great Deference
to Agency Statutory Interpretations

Chevron is the landmark Supreme Court case on judicial deference to
agency interpretations.56 Chevron established a two-step test for courts
to apply when reviewing an “agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers.”57 Under Chevron step one, courts must clarify whether
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”58 If
Congress has, then “that is the end of the matter; for the court and the
agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”59 Where the court determines that Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, “the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute.”60 Instead, the court must go
on to Chevron step two and determine “whether the agency’s answer is

53. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
54. Id. at 982–83.
55. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008). The court concluded
that “the holding of Brand X applies whether the judicial precedent at issue is that of a lower court
or the Supreme Court.” Id. In Brand X, Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion recognized: “[A] court
of appeals’ interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a regulatory statute does not foreclose a
contrary reading by the agency. That explanation would not necessarily be applicable to a decision
by this Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.” 545 U.S. at 1003
(Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Sunstein, supra note 46, 188–89.
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 842–43.
60. Id. at 843.
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based on a permissible construction of the statute.”61 If the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable, then it stands.62
In Chevron, the Court recognized that “considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer.”63 This weighty deference is
reiterated in Mead:
[A] reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s
exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a
particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s
chosen resolution seems unwise, but is obliged to accept the
agency’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the
point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.64
This strong language instructs courts to focus first on the question of
statutory clarity and then on the question of reasonableness. This rule
allows agencies, rather than reviewing courts, to make legal conclusions
and interpret statutes. As administrative law scholar Cass Sunstein notes,
this produces a climate of statutory interpretation that is at odds with
Marbury v. Madison because “in the face of ambiguity, it is
emphatically the province and duty of the administrative department to
say what the law is.”65 It is, however, the modern framework for
determining interpretations of agency administered statutes.
B.

The Supreme Court Limited the Chevron Doctrine Somewhat
Through a Clarification of Chevron Step Zero

A number of cases, and much scholarship, have explored when
Chevron deference does not apply, as well as its limitations when it
does. Courts and scholars have sought to clarify what academics call
Chevron step zero—the necessary conditions for a court to apply the
Chevron framework.66 One basic condition, stated in Chevron itself, is
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 844.
64. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
65. Sunstein, supra note 46, at 189. Some scholars disagree with Sunstein’s characterization of
Marbury v. Madison. See, e.g., 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 144–45 (Aspen
Law and Business 2002) (1994). To reconcile Chevron and Marbury, Pierce notes, “[o]nce an
agency or a court concludes that Chevron step one does not apply because Congress did not resolve
the issue in dispute, the dispute is one of policy rather than of law.” Id. at 145.
66. Sunstein, supra note 46, at 191 (“Chevron Step Zero—the initial inquiry into whether the
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that the agency is interpreting a statute that it has been delegated
authority to administer.67 If the agency has not been given authority by
Congress to administer the statute it is interpreting, reviewing courts do
not need to defer to its interpretation. Courts, for example, need not
defer to an agency’s interpretation of criminal statutes because Congress
has not delegated authority to any particular agency to interpret them.68
Another element of the step zero inquiry provides that deference is
only available when an agency’s interpretation carries the force of law.
In Christensen, the Court held that an opinion letter was not deferenceeligible because it did not carry “the force of law.”69 In Christensen, the
Acting Administrator of the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division wrote an opinion letter responding to a sheriff department’s
inquiry about whether employer-compelled overtime leave violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act.70 Although the Department of Labor
administers that Act, the Court held that deference was not warranted
because the letter did not carry the force of law.71 The Court reasoned
that the opinion letter was not an interpretation “arrived at after, for

Chevron framework applies at all”).
67. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (applying Chevron deference “[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers”).
68. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice have not been granted authority by
Congress to interpret state or federal criminal statutes. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 264
(2006) (“[T]he Attorney General must . . . evaluate compliance with federal [criminal] law in
deciding whether to prosecute; but this does not entitle him to Chevron deference.”); Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Justice Department . . . has a
very specific responsibility to determine for itself what this statute means, in order to decide when
to prosecute; but we have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with prosecuting
criminal statutes is entitled to deference.”). Because Congress has not vested special authority in the
Attorney General to interpret the federal criminal statutes (this may even implicate separation of
powers if it were the case) the agencies under the Attorney General are not given deference in their
interpretation of federal criminal statutes. Furthermore, the rule of lenity suggests that ambiguous
statutes should be construed in favor of criminal defendants rather than agencies in the criminal
context. In immigration cases, courts have not deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of a federal
criminal statute because Congress did not charge the BIA with administering it. See, e.g., Oyebanji
v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 262 (3rd Cir. 2005) (“Because the BIA is not charged with administering
18 U.S.C. § 16 and has no special expertise regarding the interpretation of that criminal statute, we
do not defer to the BIA’s interpretation of that provision.”). See generally Dan M. Kahan, Is
Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 510 (1996), for more indepth analysis.
69. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
70. Id. at 580–81.
71. Id. at 587.
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example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.”72
Although the Court did not define which agency interpretations carry the
requisite “force of law,” it gave examples of rulings that do not:
“interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not
warrant Chevron-style deference.”73 Therefore, when an agency’s
interpretation does not carry the force of law, it does not meet Chevron
step zero and Chevron deference need not be given.
C.

Chevron Deference May Even Apply When There Is a
Conflicting Judicial Precedent on Point

Recently, the Supreme Court decided Brand X and gave deference to
an agency’s interpretation even where there was circuit court precedent
on point.74 The Court in Brand X reviewed a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision examining a statutory interpretation by the Federal
Communications Commission that conflicted with relevant precedent.75
The Ninth Circuit set aside the Commission’s ruling, even though it
carried the force of law, and instead applied its existing precedent.76 The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “a court’s prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that
its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”77 Therefore, even if case law
is already on point, courts should defer to an agency’s ruling, unless the
court previously held the statute to be unambiguous.78 The Tenth Circuit
extended this rule to apply to judicial interpretations of ambiguous
statutes made by the Supreme Court.79
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Nat’l Cable and Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
75. Id. at 979.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 982.
78. An unambiguous statute implies that Congress’s intent is clearly expressed in the statute, thus
meeting Chevron step one. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984).
79. See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e conclude
that the holding of Brand X applies whether the judicial precedent at issue is that of a lower court or
the Supreme Court.”).
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The Brand X Court also addressed the circumstance of agency silence
on matters of statutory interpretation. In the absence of Congress’s or an
agency’s interpretation, a court may use its own interpretation of the
statute in question.80 If the court holds that the statute is ambiguous, it
must defer to a later agency interpretation carrying the force of law.81
The Court noted that when Congress delegates authority to an agency, its
interpretation is still given deferential weight regardless of “the order in
which the judicial and administrative constructions occur.”82 In dicta,
however, the Court stated that a prior judicial determination that a statute
is unambiguous forecloses any future agency interpretations.83 This is
because an unambiguous statute “contains no gap for the agency to
fill.”84 Thus when a court has previously determined that a statute is
unambiguous this interpretation stands in the face of a later agency
ruling that may provide a conflicting interpretation.85
Chevron and its progeny limit the role appellate courts play in
interpreting statutes administered by agencies. Despite the traditional
role of the judiciary, agencies, and not courts, are often given deference
on issues of statutory interpretation and legal conclusions.86
D.

The BIA’s Interpretations of the INA Are Deference-Eligible
When Issued Through Precedential Opinions

In the immigration context, Chevron deference is available to the
BIA’s construction of ambiguous terms in the INA.87 Congress
delegated authority to several federal agencies to administer the INA.
Congress gave general interpretative authority to the Attorney General
who then delegated authority to a number of agencies within the
Department of Justice (DOJ).88 Prosecutorial authority rests with the
80. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 983.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 985.
86. Id. at 982 (“[A]llowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an agency from interpreting an
ambiguous statute . . . would allow a court’s interpretation to override an agency’s.”).
87. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron
deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms [in the INA] concrete meaning.”).
88. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2006)
(“The Attorney General shall establish such regulations, . . . review such administrative
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Department of Homeland Security, which absorbed a number of duties
formerly tasked to the Immigration and Naturalization Services.89
Adjudicative authority is vested in the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, a DOJ agency, which includes immigration courts and the
BIA.90 The BIA reviews cases adjudicated by immigration judges.91
Under the INA, lawful permanent residents are rendered removable if
they commit an “aggravated felony” at any time after they are admitted
to the United States.92 The immigration consequences for having
committed an aggravated felony are sweeping: it triggers “mandatory
detention during deportation or removal proceedings, the elimination of
discretionary relief from deportation or removal, and a permanent bar
against reentry into the United States.”93 Congress further expanded
these consequences after the enactment of IIRIRA, which made the
described provisions retroactive.94 IIRIRA added a series of crimes to
the aggravated felony provision, including “sexual abuse of a minor.”95
This addition provides a severe consequence for aliens, “making aliens
convicted of those crimes deportable and ineligible for most forms of
immigration benefits or relief from deportation.”96
Determining whether a criminal conviction is an aggravated felony
for immigration purposes requires interpretation of the INA, federal
criminal statutes, and state criminal statutes, thus raising the issue of
judicial deference to the BIA.97 Congress defined a number of
aggravated felonies by cross-referencing federal statutes. For example, a
non-citizen convicted of “a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as
the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”).
89. Id. § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006) (“Secretary of Homeland Security shall be
charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter[.]”).
90. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (2008).
91. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(j) (2008).
92. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
93. Iris Bennet, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of
“Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1701–02 (1999).
94. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628, § 321(b) (1996).
95. Id. at § 321(a)(1).
96. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, § 350, at 505–06 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
97. See, e.g., Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining
whether a state criminal conviction for statutory rape categorically constitutes sexual abuse of a
minor under the INA as defined by the federal criminal definition of sexual abuse of a minor).
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16,” is deportable as an aggravated felon.98 Courts have recognized that
“[b]ecause the BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16” its
interpretation of this provision does not warrant deference.99 The
aggravated felonies defined by cross-reference provide an example of
BIA statutory interpretation that merits no deference under Chevron.
On the other hand, when the BIA issues an order relating to a term
specific to the INA, it is acting within its authority. In INS v. AguirreAguirre,100 the Supreme Court determined that Chevron deference
applied to BIA adjudications interpreting provisions of the INA.101 Such
adjudications by the BIA meet Chevron step zero because the Attorney
General “has vested the BIA with power to exercise the ‘discretion and
authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law’ in the course of
‘considering and determining cases before it.’”102 Furthermore, the Court
recognized that “the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it
gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of
case-by-case adjudication.’”103 Thus, the BIA has been delegated
authority from Congress, via the Attorney General,104 to administer,
adjudicate, and interpret provisions of the INA.105 In addition, the Ninth
Circuit has ruled that published decisions of the BIA106 also meet the
98. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(2006).
99. See, e.g., Oyebanji v. Gonzalez, 418 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2005).
100. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
101. Id. at 424 (“It is clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory
scheme. The INA provides that ‘[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and
enforcement’ of the statute and that the ‘determination and ruling by the Attorney General with
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994))).
102. Id. at 425 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)).
103. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)).
104. See supra note 88.
105. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (2003).
106. Notably, the BIA decision reviewed by the Supreme Court in Aguirre-Aguirre was
unpublished. See Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2008) (deferring to
an unpublished BIA opinion in light of Aguirre-Aguirre). Although the Supreme Court did not
discuss this aspect of the decision, it still chose to accord the BIA a great deal of deference. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (applying deference to an unpublished BIA opinion). Although there is not
an affirmative ruling on whether unpublished BIA decisions deserve Chevron deference, courts
have either given unpublished decisions deference following the Supreme Court’s example in
Aguirre-Aguirre, or applied a narrower level of deference such as persuasive deference. GodinezArroyo, 540 F.3d at 850 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). But see 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (2003) (“[T]he Board, through precedent decisions, shall provide clear and
uniform guidance to the Service, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper
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force of law test since they are binding on immigration judges.107
II.

THE BIA INTERPRETED THE INA PROVISION “SEXUAL
ABUSE OF A MINOR” AND CHOSE A BROAD
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM

The BIA addressed the interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor” in
Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez.108 The Board issued an en banc opinion
that articulated a guide for determining whether a conviction rises to
sexual abuse of a minor under the INA.109 The issue before the Board
was whether a Texas conviction for indecent exposure in front of a child
constituted sexual abuse of a minor and thus an aggravated felony.110 In
construing “sexual abuse of a minor,” the BIA looked to federal criminal
definitions as persuasive authority.111 The Board identified four federal
statutes using the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor.”112 Three are titled
“Sexual abuse,” “Sexual abuse of a minor or ward,” and “Definitions for
chapter.”113 They each “require a sexual act, a component of which . . . is
contact.”114 The fourth statute, titled “Child victims’ and child witnesses’
rights,” defines sexual abuse as “the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist
another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape,
molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of
children, or incest with children.”115 The Board found that this definition
served as a “useful identification of the forms of sexual abuse.”116
Since the phrase does not cross-reference a specific federal statute, the
Board stated that it was not bound to using any particular federal
interpretation and administration of the Act and its implementing regulations.” (emphasis added)).
107. See Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We accord
Chevron deference where there is ‘binding agency precedent on-point (either in the form of a
regulation or a published BIA case).’” (quoting Kharana v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1280, 1283 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2007))).
108. 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA 1999).
109. Id. at 996.
110. Id. at 991–92.
111. Id. at 994–95.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2243, 2246 (1994)).
114. Id. at 995.
115. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) (1994)).
116. Id. at 995.
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statutory definition.117 It thus went on to consider other statutory
constructions, including a plain meaning analysis of the three words in
question. Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the Board noted that “the term
‘sexual abuse’ is commonly defined as ‘[i]llegal sex acts performed
against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance.’”118 The
Board also explored the definition of “abuse” in general, finding that
“[a]buse is defined in relevant part as physical or mental
maltreatment.”119
The Board chose to use the broadest federal definition.120 Recognizing
that “states categorize and define sex crimes against children in many
different ways,”121 the Board chose the sexual abuse definition found in
the “Child victims’ and witnesses’ rights” statute.122 It chose this
definition in part because the other federal statutes limited abuse to
conduct involving contact123 and were therefore “too restrictive to
encompass the numerous state crimes that can be viewed as sexual
abuse.”124 While the Board selected this definition to apply in Mr.
Rodriguez-Rodriguez’s case, it expressly stated that it was “not adopting
this statute as a definitive standard or definition but invok[ing] it as a
guide in identifying the types of crimes we would consider to be sexual
abuse of a minor.”125
Two dissenting opinions argued that the majority should have adopted
a narrower definition or no definition at all. Board Member Filppu’s
dissent, which three other members joined, argued against adopting any
of the available federal definitions, noting: “Congress, it appears, has left
us much room to define the contours of what amounts to ‘sexual abuse
of a minor.’ I am ill at ease providing a comprehensive answer in our
first effort to grapple with the question.”126
Board Member Guendelsberger’s dissent, which three other members
117. Id. at 994.
118. Id. at 996 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990)).
119. Id.
120. See Dan Kesselbrenner and Lori D. Rosenberg, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES, §7:25, at
7-97 (Thomson West 2008) (1984).
121. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996.
122. Id. at 995 (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 998 (Filppu, Bd. Member, dissenting).
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joined, focused on the broadness of the majority’s chosen definition and
advocated for a narrower approach. First, it disagreed with the adoption
of 18 U.S.C. § 3509 as the guide because that statute focuses on
children’s rights and “is a social welfare provision.”127 The dissent
suggested that a statute whose purpose is to afford rights to children is
not useful in determining whether or not a criminal conviction arises to
the level of an aggravated felony.128 Second, the dissent asserted that the
severe consequences of removal ought to compel one of the narrower
definitions considered and rejected by the majority.129 Third, in the
dissent’s statutory interpretation, Board Member Guendelsberger
asserted that “the decision by Congress to place ‘sexual abuse of a
minor’ in section 101(a)(43)(A), alongside murder and rape, suggests
that it was focusing on the most egregious offenses” and that a broad
definition would be over-inclusive.130
The Guendelsberger dissent suggested using a more limited definition
of sexual abuse of a minor.131 It advocated for the use of a federal statute
titled “Abusive sexual contact.”132 Included in this definition was sexual
contact that involves “the intentional touching, either directly or through
the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks
of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”133 The dissent pointed
out that both this definition and the majority’s result in an expansion of
the aggravated felony provision and, therefore, the focus should be on
which is the most appropriate134 given the gravity of the consequences,
including deportation,135 and the phrase’s placement alongside rape and
murder.136

127. Id. at 1000 (Guendelsberger, Bd. Member, dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1002.
131. Id. at 1005.
132. Id. at 1000 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)
(2006)).
133. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1994), which references 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) (1994)
(current versions at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a), 2246(3) (2006))).
134. Id. at 1001.
135. Id. at 1000.
136. Id. at 1002.
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III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT REFUSED TO DEFER TO THE BIA’S
DEFINITION OF “SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR” ON
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

The docket for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is saturated with
immigration cases.137 According to statements by one Ninth Circuit
judge, immigration appeals accounted for approximately 46% of the
Ninth Circuit’s docket in 2007.138 Like all circuit courts of appeals, the
Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review immigration appeals from the
BIA on matters of law, including whether a crime meets the definition of
an aggravated felony.139 The Ninth Circuit has reviewed a number of
cases relating to the aggravated felony provision of “sexual abuse of a
minor.” There are two ways in which the court addresses aggravated
felony determinations for immigration violations: as an immigration
appeal from an order of deportation by the BIA140 or as an appeal from a
sentencing determination from federal district court.141
In the first circumstance, appeals from orders of deportation, circuit
courts have jurisdiction to review legal determination made by the
agency.142 The other circumstance, appeals from sentencing, affects noncitizens who unlawfully re-entered the United States after deportation.
The federal crime of unlawful re-entry carries a two-year maximum
penalty.143 However, if the non-citizen re-enters after having been
137. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit are particularly “overwhelmed” with
immigration cases. See John S. Baker, Article, A Letter to Lou Dobbs: How to Reverse Illegal
Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 373, 382 (2008).
138. Id. at 382 n.23 (“[In] the Second Circuit, twenty percent of its docket is immigration cases;
in the Ninth Circuit, I think we are up to forty-six percent.” (quoting Honorable Carlos T. Bea,
Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Remarks at the 2007 National Lawyers Convention:
Immigration Amnesty and the Rule of Law (Nov. 16, 2007))).
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) (“Nothing . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review,
shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a
petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”); see,
e.g., Valencia v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We . . . have jurisdiction to
consider the limited question of whether a crime is an aggravated felony.”).
140. See, e.g., Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The BIA
affirmed the [immigration judge]’s finding that Estrada-Espinoza had been convicted of an
aggravated felony . . . . This timely petition for review followed.”).
141. See, e.g., U.S. v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining whether
a sentencing enhancement was warranted, “the district court, in sentencing appellant, took into
consideration his 1987 conviction under California Penal Code Section 288(a)”).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
143. See id. § 1326(a).
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convicted of an aggravated felony, the sentence for the unlawful re-entry
increases to a maximum of twenty years144 and adds a sixteen-point
sentencing enhancement.145
Because aggravated felony convictions apply retroactively, federal
district court judges may have to determine whether a non-citizen’s prior
conviction constituted an aggravated felony, even if an immigration
judge had not so determined.146 In these cases, the non-citizen criminal
defendant often argues on appeal that the phrase “sexual abuse of a
minor” is ambiguous in order to trigger the rule of lenity and deference
to the defendant’s interpretation of the phrase.147 However, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have found the phrase
unambiguous.148
The issue of sexual abuse of a minor has arisen under both the BIA
appeal and federal sentencing circumstances in the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit has held that its rulings from the sentencing cases may be
applied in the immigration context.149 United States v. Baron-Medina,150
for example, arose in the criminal sentencing context rather than the
immigration context; however, the court noted in a subsequent case that
“for immigration judges, as well as for us, Baron-Medina controls when
‘sexual abuse of a minor’ is at issue.”151

144. See id. § 1326(b)(2).
145. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2008) (“[A] conviction for a
felony that is . . . a crime of violence . . . increase[s] [sentencing points] by 16 levels[.]”); see also
id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (defining crime of violence as “the following offense[] under federal,
state, or local law . . . sexual abuse of a minor[.]”).
146. See, e.g., Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d at 1145 (determining whether a sentencing enhancement
was warranted, “the district court, in sentencing appellant, took into consideration his 1987
conviction under California Penal Code Section 288(a)”).
147. See, e.g., Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[Petitioner]
contends that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” is ambiguous and so must be construed in his
favor . . . .”).
148. Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We find that § 101(a)(43)(A) is not
ambiguous.”); U.S. v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We find that the plain
meaning of § 1101(a)(43)(A) is unambiguous . . . .”); U.S. v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 607
n.11 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e find that the phrase ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ is not ambiguous.”).
149. See Cedano-Viera, 324 F.3d at 1067.
150. 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999).
151. Cedano-Viera, 324 F.3d at 1067.
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A.

The Ninth Circuit Has Alternated Between Deferring to the BIA
and Applying Its Own Construction of “Sexual Abuse of a
Minor”

A month before the BIA defined “sexual abuse of a minor” in
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit decided a case addressing the
issue. In United States v. Baron-Medina, the court reviewed a district
court’s determination of whether a conviction under California’s lewd or
lascivious acts statute was sexual abuse of a minor and thus an
aggravated felony for federal sentencing purposes.152 In order to
interpret “sexual abuse of a minor,” which at the time was unaddressed
by the BIA, the court “employ[ed] the ordinary, contemporary, and
common meaning of the words that Congress used.”153 It then applied
the definition to the elements of the state conviction, to see if a
conviction under that statute constituted an aggravated felony for
immigration purposes.154 Because the conviction was for touching a
child under the age of fourteen with a sexual intent, the court found that
it “indisputably falls within the common, everyday meanings of the
words ‘sexual’ and ‘minor’ [and] . . . [t]he use of young children for the
gratification of sexual desires constitutes an abuse.”155
The next time the Ninth Circuit faced the issue, in Afridi v.
Gonzalez,156 it deferred to the BIA’s definition based on Chevron
principles.157 The Ninth Circuit reviewed a decision by the BIA and held
that statutory rape was sexual abuse of a minor by deferring to the BIA’s
definition of the crime in Rodriguez-Rodriguez.158 In Afridi, an Afghani
man solicited sex from a seventeen-year-old and was convicted under
California’s statutory rape laws.159 In interpreting the sexual abuse of a
minor provision of the INA, the court stated that “[t]he BIA’s definition

152. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d at 1145.
153. Id. at 1146 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1147.
156. 442 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). Afridi was overruled by a unanimous Ninth Circuit sitting en
banc. Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1160 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008); see infra III.B.
157. Afridi, 442 F.3d at 1216 (“The BIA’s definition [of sexual abuse of a minor] was based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1214.
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was based on a permissible construction of the statute.”160 The court
applied the BIA’s definition and concluded that “[a] conviction under
this statute meets the BIA’s interpretation of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ as
encompassing any offense that involves ‘the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage
in . . . sexually explicit conduct.’”161
In the sentencing context, the Ninth Circuit has defined sexual abuse
of a minor based on its plain meaning, and has not included statutory
rape of older teenagers. In one case, United States v. Lopez-Solis,162 the
court used the dictionary definition of the term “abuse”: “misuse . . . to
use or treat so as to injure, hurt or damage . . . to commit indecent assault
on.”163 The court found this definition consistent with definitions
adopted in other circuits and held it broad enough to encompass
emotional and physical abuse.164 In applying the definition to the
statutory rape conviction, the court reasoned that “[c]onsensual sexual
penetration of an individual between the ages of 17 and 18 by a 22 year
old does not necessarily involve physical ‘misuse’ ‘injur[y],’ or
‘assault.’”165 Furthermore, the court found that physical harm was not
necessarily a result of the conduct.166 In addition, it noted that “while
consensual underage sex may be psychologically harmful to a young
teen, it may not be harmful to an older one.”167 The Ninth Circuit
recognized that its earlier Afridi opinion resulted in the exact opposite
conclusion—that statutory rape was sexual abuse of a minor.168 But
because that case arose in the immigration context and because the court
“found the Board’s construction [of the phrase ‘sexual abuse of a
minor’] permissible [it] had to defer to it.”169
Where the Ninth Circuit was not compelled to defer to the BIA’s

160. Id. at 1216.
161. Id. at 1217 (citing Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 995 (BIA 1999)).
162. 447 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2006).
163. Id. at 1207 (citing United State v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Although the court did recognize that physical effects such as pregnancy or the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases could still result. Id.
167. Id. at 1208 (internal citations omitted).
168. Id. at 1209.
169. Id. (alternations in original) (quoting Afridi v. Gonzalez, 442 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir.
2006)).
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definition, it applied a plain language interpretation and then compared
the state crime of conviction with the plain meaning of “sexual abuse of
a minor.” By contrast, in the immigration context following the BIA’s
interpretation of the phrase, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA’s
interpretation. This state of confusion, with different definitions
attaching to the same term, persisted until the Ninth Circuit heard and
then re-heard Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey.
B.

The Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey Court Declined to Follow the
BIA on Procedural Grounds and Chose to Define “Sexual Abuse
of a Minor” Using a Federal Statute

Mr. Estrada-Espinoza was a lawful permanent resident.170 When he
was twenty, he began dating someone who was sixteen years old.171 The
two moved in together, first in his parents’ house and then into a house
of their own.172 They eventually had a child together.173 The District
Attorney filed fourteen sex-offense charges against Mr. EstradaEspinoza, including statutory rape.174 Mr. Estrada-Espinosa was
convicted on four of those charges and sentenced to 365 days in jail.175
DHS subsequently filed charges to have him deported for committing an
aggravated felony.176
An immigration judge found that Mr. Estrada-Espinoza was
removable as an aggravated felon under the sexual abuse of a minor
clause, particularly because of his conviction under section 261.5(c) of
the California Penal Code.177 That provision regulates sexual intercourse
between a person over eighteen years-old, with someone who is under
eighteen and at least three years younger, where the two are not
married.178 Mr. Estrada-Espinoza appealed to the BIA, which affirmed
the immigration judge’s order based on the definition of “sexual abuse
170. Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
171. Interview with Saad Ahmad, supra note 6.
172. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1150.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1150–51.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1150. While waiting for a resolution of his case, Mr. Estrada-Espinoza was placed in
immigration detention, where he stayed from May 2005 until he was released in October 2008.
Interview with Saad Ahmad, supra note 6.
177. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1151.
178. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(c) (2008).
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of a minor” it adopted in Rodriguez-Rodriguez.179
Mr. Estrada-Espinoza appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a threejudge panel denied his petition in Estrada-Espinoza v. Gonzalez.180 The
panel ruled that the case was not distinguishable from Afridi because
both cases involved the exact same criminal statute.181 However, two of
the three judges joined a concurring opinion stating that “Afridi was
incorrectly decided and should be reconsidered.”182 One year later, in
Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en
banc, overruled Afridi, and granted Mr. Estrada-Espinoza’s petition for
review.183
In Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit examined whether
a conviction under section 261.5(c) of the California Penal Code184
constituted an aggravated felony under the INA’s “sexual abuse of a
minor” provision.185 The court first assessed the generic elements of the
crime by looking to the elements enumerated in the federal offense of
sexual abuse of a minor.186 The court also used plain-meaning analysis
to interpret the term.187 Looking to the “ordinary, contemporary, and
common meaning of the words,”188 the court defined “abuse” as
“physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment” or as “use or
treat[ment] so as to injure, hurt, or damage.”189
The court chose the federal definition found under 18 U.S.C. § 2243,
entitled “Sexual abuse of a minor or ward,”190 stating that it is a specific
crime that reflects the plain language of the INA.191 The elements of this
179. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1151.
180. 498 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruled by Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d 1147).
181. Id.
182. Id. (S. Thomas, J., concurring).
183. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1160 n.15.
184. This was the same statute under which Mr. Afridi was convicted. See Afridi v. Gonzalez,
442 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2006).
185. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1150.
186. Id. at 1152.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999)).
189. Id. at 1153 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006)).
190. Id. at 1152 (“Whoever . . . knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who—(1)
has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years
younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 15 years, or both.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006))).
191. Id. at 1156.
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definition include “(1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act;
(3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age
difference of at least four years between the defendant and the minor.”192
The court noted that these elements are also found in the Model Penal
Code’s definition of statutory rape.193 It further acknowledged that the
age of consent in the majority of states is sixteen.194 The court then
compared the elements of the crime Mr. Estrada-Espinoza was convicted
of to the generic federal definition to determine whether California’s
statutory rape law categorically constitutes sexual abuse of a minor.195
The court concluded that because the California statute requires an age
difference of only three years, rather than four, it was broader than the
generic federal definition and thus did “not categorically constitute
‘sexual abuse of a minor.’”196 Based on this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit held that Mr. Estrada-Espinoza was not deportable as an
aggravated felon.197
In a footnote, the court rejected the definition of sexual abuse used by
the BIA in Rodriguez-Rodriguez.198 It stated that the definition, taken
from 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) “does not define a crime, but merely
addresses the rights of child victims and witnesses.”199 By contrast,
section 2243 “is a criminal statute outlining the elements of the
offense.”200 The court stated that it was therefore more likely that
Congress intended to incorporate the definition from section 2243 into
the aggravated felony definition in the INA.201
The Estrada-Espinoza court briefly addressed the issue of deference
to the BIA definition of sexual abuse of a minor, but decided that the
192. Id. at 1152 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006)).
193. Id. at 1153 (“A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, or any person
who engages in deviate sexual intercourse or causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse,
is guilty of an offense if: (a) the other person is less than [sixteen] years old and the actor is at least
[four] years older than the other person . . . .” (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (2001))).
194. Id. at 1153 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. at 1158 (applying the categorical approach as set out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 602 (1990)).
196. Id. at 1159–60.
197. Id. at 1160.
198. Id. at 1152 n.2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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deference framework was inapplicable.202 The court noted that it
“accord[s] Chevron deference to interpretations in published BIA
decisions within the BIA’s area of expertise.”203 The court also noted
that Rodriguez-Rodriguez “has the force of decisional law.”204 However,
the court declined to defer to the decision, because the BIA “did not
interpret a statute within the meaning of Chevron, but only provided a
‘guide’ for later interpretation.”205 In a footnote, the court noted that
“[e]ven if we apply the familiar Chevron analysis, we would necessarily
conclude, at step one, that the Rodriguez-Rodriguez guide does not
warrant Chevron deference” because here, congressional intent is
unambiguous.206
IV.

OTHER CIRCUITS HAVE HELD THAT “SEXUAL ABUSE
OF A MINOR” IS UNAMBIGUOUS BASED ON THE
STATUTE’S PLAIN LANGUAGE

Although Estrada-Espinoza did not raise the ambiguity of “sexual
abuse of a minor,” that issue was addressed by the Eleventh, Seventh,
and Fifth Circuits in both the immigration appeal and unlawful re-entry
sentencing contexts; all three circuits found the term unambiguous.207
Each circuit decided these cases shortly after the BIA’s RodriguezRodriguez decision and concluded that the phrase is unambiguous using
a plain language analysis.208
In United States v. Zavala-Sustaita,209 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
clarity of the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” in the sentencing

202. Id. at 1156–57.
203. Id. at 1156 (citing Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006));
Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2006)).
204. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1157.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1157 n.7.
207. See United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2001); Lara-Ruiz v. INS,
241 F.3d 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 607 n.11 (5th
Cir. 2000).
208. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d at 1164 (“We find that the plain meaning of § 1101(a)(43)(A) is
unambiguous . . . .”); Lara-Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 942 (“We find that § 101(a)(43)(A) is not
ambiguous.”); Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 607 n.11 (“[W]e find that the phrase ‘sexual abuse of a
minor’ is not ambiguous . . . .”).
209. 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
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context.210 It determined that a conviction under section 21.11(a)(2) of
the Texas Penal Code for exposing oneself to children under thirteen
years old was sexual abuse of a minor.211 The court based its conclusion
“on the clear language” of the statute, noting that the phrase was “not
ambiguous.”212 The court mentioned Rodriguez-Rodriguez briefly,
noting that “the BIA addressed the exact issue presented here.”213 The
court took note of the broad federal definition used by the BIA and
stated “[t]his definition would seemingly cover an offense” such as the
one under the Texas statute at issue.214 It did not, however, defer to the
BIA’s decision.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit again addressed whether certain proscribed
conduct constituted sexual abuse of a minor and similarly applied the
“generic and contemporary meaning” of the phrase.215 Like the ZavalaSustaita court, it looked to “(1) whether the defendant’s conduct
involved a ‘child’; (2) whether that conduct was ‘sexual’; and (3)
whether the sexual conduct was ‘abusive.’”216 This case did not mention
Rodriguez-Rodriguez.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the clarity of the phrase “sexual abuse
of a minor” in the immigration context.217 It also found that the phrase
“is not ambiguous . . . [b]y considering the ordinary meaning of the
words.”218 In a later opinion, the court examined and applied the BIA’s
Rodriguez-Rodriguez definition.219 The court noted that while the BIA
used the broad federal statute “for illumination as to what constitutes
sexual abuse of a minor, it did not intend that definition to be
dispositive.”220 It went on to “emphasize[] that Congress intended the
phrase ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ to broadly incorporate all acts that fall
within the ordinary, contemporary and common meaning of the

210. Id. at 603.
211. Id. at 602–03.
212. Id. at 607, 607 n.11.
213. Id. at 608; Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991,995 (BIA 1999).
214. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 606 n.8.
215. United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2008).
216. Id. (citing Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604–05 (5th Cir. 2000)).
217. Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2001).
218. Id. at 942.
219. Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2005).
220. Id.
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words.”221 The court found that a non-citizen’s conviction for soliciting
oral sex from a minor fit into both the ordinary meaning and the BIA’s
broad interpretation even though his conduct lacked physical contact or
threat of harm.222
The Eleventh Circuit also found the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor”
unambiguous.223 This case arose in the sentencing for unlawful re-entry
context and the defendant argued that the phrase “sexual abuse of a
minor” was ambiguous because it was unclear “whether physical contact
[was] a necessary element of the offense.”224 The court held that the
phrase was unambiguous and defined it as “a perpetrator’s physical or
nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for a purpose associated
with sexual gratification.”225 The court noted that the lack of crossreferencing to federal statutes “indicate[d] Congress’s intent to rely on
the plain meaning of the terms.”226 A few months later, another Eleventh
Circuit opinion addressing the scope of the phrase “sexual abuse of a
minor” mentioned the BIA’s definition in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, but
applied the circuit’s aforementioned definition.227
The circuit courts addressing the issue of sexual abuse of a minor
have found that the phrase is unambiguous and have generally applied
the plain meaning of the statute. While they may have referred to the
BIA’s definition in order to support their ordinary meaning
determinations, they did not defer to it.
V.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD RULE THAT “SEXUAL
ABUSE OF A MINOR,” IS UNAMBIGUOUS WHEN FACED
WITH A SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGE TO THE BIA’S
INTERPRETATION

By disregarding the BIA’s Rodriguez-Rodriguez definition on
procedural grounds, the Ninth Circuit invites the BIA to issue an

221. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
222. Id. at 765.
223. United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2001).
224. Id. at 1163.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1164.
227. Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We cannot say that the Board’s
interpretation of section 1101(a)(43)(A) was unreasonable. Our recent decision in Padilla-Reyes
also supports the Board’s view.”).
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interpretive definition that carries the force of law. The BIA could issue
the identical definition that it did in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, or it could
issue a modified definition that is either broader or narrower than its
earlier effort.228 Regardless of what the BIA’s definition might be, the
Ninth Circuit could and should rule that the phrase “sexual abuse of a
minor” is unambiguous. There are a number of factors and arguments to
support this holding. In particular, by looking at the plain meaning of the
statute, prior precedent, decisions from sister circuits, and policy
considerations, the Ninth Circuit should be confident in not deferring to
the BIA.
A.

A Textual Interpretation of the Statute Indicates that It Is
Unambiguous

The Supreme Court’s aggravated felony decision in Leocal v.
Ashcroft229 calls for a common sense and plain language approach to
statutory interpretations of the INA.230 The Court determined that a DUI
conviction was not a crime of violence under the INA based on the
ordinary meaning of the phrase “crime of violence.”231 It stated that
“[w]hen interpreting a statute, we must give words their ‘ordinary or
natural’ meaning.”232 Similarly, in this context, the Ninth Circuit should
determine whether non-citizen convictions fall within the ordinary and
natural meaning of “sexual,” “abuse,” and “minor.”233
In Estrada-Espinoza, the Ninth Circuit flirted with stating that the
definition is unambiguous. As it suggested in a footnote, the Ninth
Circuit could have dismissed the BIA’s interpretation on the ground that
the INA provision was unambiguous based on its plain meaning.234 The
Ninth Circuit explained that “sexual abuse of a minor” is defined by
federal statute and is “a common title for offenses under state criminal

228. See, e.g., Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 515 (BIA 2008) (issuing a ruling in light
of a Ninth Circuit remand due to the absence of a definition of child abuse, “we agree with the DHS
that Congress intended section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) [child abuse] to be construed broadly”).
229. 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
230. Id. (using the “ordinary meaning of the term” in question).
231. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
232. Id. at 9.
233. See Kesselbrenner and Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 7-64 (“The decision of Leocal v.
Ashcroft may provide new authority to support a common sense construction of the statute . . . .”).
234. See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1157 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008).
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codes.”235 It went on to explain that the crime needed no crossreferencing because, like murder and rape,236 which also lack crossreferencing, “the term already denotes a clearly defined criminal
offense.”237 Moreover, the court’s reference to Chevron suggested that it
would later conclude that “Congress has spoken directly to the issue”
and thus the court’s analysis would end at Chevron step one.238
B.

The Ninth Circuit’s Own Precedent Calls for an Unambiguous
Reading of the Statute.

The Ninth Circuit’s case law further confirms that a plain meaning
analysis of the phrase demonstrates that it is unambiguous. In both
United States v. Lopez-Solis and United States v. Baron-Medina, the
court applied a plain meaning interpretation to the phrase.239 In both
cases, the court “employ[ed] the ordinary, contemporary and common
meaning of the words that Congress used”240 by “coupl[ing] the
dictionary definition of ‘abuse’ with the common understanding of
‘sexual’ and ‘minor.’”241 The court defined abuse as “misuse . . . to use
or treat so as to injure, hurt, or damage . . . to commit indecent assault
on.”242 In an appeal from the BIA, where the non-citizen argued for
relief under the theory that “sexual abuse of a minor” was ambiguous,
the Ninth Circuit responded, “[A]s we held in Baron-Medina, the phrase
is not ambiguous given its ‘ordinary, contemporary, and common
meaning.”243 While Brand X held that a reasonable agency interpretation
of an ambiguous statute trumps circuit court precedent, prior circuit
court precedent holding that a statute is unambiguous forecloses a later
agency interpretation of the statute.244 Therefore, if the Ninth Circuit

235. Id. at 1156.
236. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(A) (2006).
237. Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1156.
238. Id. at 1157 n.7.
239. United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1207 (2006); United States v. Baron-Medina,
187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999).
240. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d at 1146 (citation omitted).
241. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d at 1207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Id.
243. Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003).
244. 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
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reviewed the substantive question of interpreting “sexual abuse of a
minor,” its prior holding that the phrase is unambiguous would trump
even a reasonable agency interpretation.245
C.

Sister Circuits Have Also Found that a Plain Reading of the
Statute Reveals Its Unambiguous Meaning

The Ninth Circuit would be consistent with other circuit courts if it
ruled that the statute was unambiguous. The Seventh, Eleventh, and
Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have all found that “sexual abuse of a
minor” under INA section 101(a)(43)(A) is unambiguous.246 These
courts opted for the plain, common understanding of the terms for
applying the categorical approach, rather than relying on federal
definitions or reading ambiguity into the provision. As these circuits
discussed, a plain reading of the statute is appropriate. The Fifth Circuit
provides a categorical analysis based on the plain meaning: “(1) whether
the defendant’s conduct involved a ‘child’; (2) whether that conduct was
‘sexual’; and (3) whether the sexual conduct was ‘abusive.’”247 These
circuit courts, as well as the BIA, have found that abuse includes both
physical and nonphysical maltreatment.248 In examining the issue of
whether sexual abuse of a minor is ambiguous, these circuit courts are
consistent in finding that it is not.

agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion.”).
245. Id. at 985.
246. See United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2001); Lara-Ruiz v. INS,
241 F.3d 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 607 n.11 (5th
Cir. 2000).
247. United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2008).
248. See Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that abuse “can take the
form of physical or mental mistreatment.”); Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d at 1163 (defining “sexual
abuse of a minor” as “a perpetrator’s physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for
a purpose associated with sexual gratification”); Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 605 (“Since
psychological harm can occur without physical contact, a distinction based only on physical contact
would miss the essential nature of ‘sexual abuse.’”); Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 996
(BIA 1999).

551

Enoka_Comment_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

Washington Law Review
D.

9/2/2009 1:09 PM

Vol. 84:523, 2009

The Plain Meaning Definition of “Sexual Abuse of a Minor”
Best Comports with the “Aggravated Felony” Label by
Requiring Actual Abuse

Perhaps most importantly, the plain meaning of “sexual abuse of a
minor” and its application to a non-citizen’s conviction would achieve
Congress’ intent: to remove those non-citizens who prey upon and abuse
minors. As other circuits have discussed, physical or psychological
maltreatment requiring demonstrable harm should be an element of
“abuse.”249 Thus, as in Juan and Sonia’s case, conduct that is not
inherently abusive, such as consensual sex with an older teenager—a
young adult—would not be sanctioned with banishment. This still
protects minors by sanctioning those who abuse them. It would,
however, limit the sweeping expanse of the already harsh category of
aggravated felonies to those whose conduct Congress finds truly
egregious.
CONCLUSION
With the growing number of crimes being added to the list of
aggravated felonies, the clash between BIA interpretations and circuit
court interpretations will undoubtedly continue. Estrada-Espinoza v.
Mukasey examines the impact that interpreting one crime, “sexual abuse
of a minor,” can have on the immigration system, the judicial system,
and the lives of non-citizens.
While debate on the impact of the Chevron doctrine continues, in the
immigration context, both Congress and the Supreme Court have
indicated that the doctrine is especially important. Where the BIA
exercises its power to interpret provisions within its governing statute in
published, precedential opinions, circuit courts should defer unless
Congress’s intent is clear or the interpretation is unreasonable.
The Ninth Circuit properly declined deference to the BIA’s definition
of “sexual abuse of a minor” because the agency had not issued a
precedential opinion carrying the force of law. However, the BIA will
likely issue a precedential opinion defining the term as it did with other
contested phrases in the INA.
When faced with a substantive challenge to the BIA’s definition of
“sexual abuse of a minor,” the Ninth Circuit should hold that the phrase
249. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d at 1164.
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is unambiguous. This result is mentioned in Estrada-Espinoza v.
Mukasey and is consistent with a plain meaning analysis of the statute.250
It is also consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the phrase
elsewhere in its case law, as well as with interpretations in other circuits.
The Ninth Circuit, in accordance with other circuits, has ruled in the past
that the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” in the INA is unambiguous.
When this issue inevitably returns to the Ninth Circuit following a
precedential BIA opinion, the court should join the other circuits in
finding that Congress spoke clearly.

250. Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1157 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008).
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